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Healthcare-Secure, Compliant, Resilient

Monthly Cyber Briefing July 2023

## Logistics

- All attendees in "Listen Only Mode"
- Please ask content related questions in Q&A
- Cyber Briefings are eligible for HIMSS & CHIME CE credit
- Recording and final slides shared within 48 hours
- Please take a few minutes to provide feedback via survey prompt at the end of this session

#### HIMSS & CHIME approved!

2023 Monthly Cyber Briefings are now eligible for HIMSS & CHIME certification CE credit

## Agenda

- Cyber update
- NIST CSF 2.0



## July's Speakers



Steve Cagle, MBA, HCISSP Chief Executive Officer



Dave Bailey, CISSP VP, Consulting Services



Rick Lemay Director, Consulting Services for Hospitals & Health Systems



## Halfway Through 2023 – Where We Stand

41 Individuals' records compromised 6/30/23<sup>1</sup> 56% Increase in ransomware attacks May 2023 vs 2022<sup>2</sup>

Hospitals systems hit with ransomware in 2023<sup>3</sup>

**30%** Revenue lost due to a ransomware attack for a small healthcare provider<sup>4</sup>

#### **Clearwater**

1 Midyear Health Data Breach Analysis: The Top Culprits (databreachtoday.com)
 2 https://www.nccgroup.com/media/sznpjuy5/may-threat-pulse-2023.pdf
 3 <u>https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/thirtythree-us-hospitals/</u>
 4 https://www.hipaajournal.com/healthcare-ransomware-attacks-threaten-up-to-30-of-operating-income/

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## Recent Large Healthcare Breaches

#### Managed Care of North America Hacking Incident Impacts 8.9 Million Individuals

Posted By Steve Alder on May 30, 2023

## HCA Healthcare Suffers Data Breach, 11M Patients Impacted

An unauthorized party stole a list of information used for email messages to patients and posted it on an online forum, HCA Healthcare stated in its data breach notice.

## Clearwater

Victim of LockBit ransomware group. Reported May 30.

Largest health data breach of 2023. Reported July 10.

## MOVEit Vulnerability – CLOP Ransomware Gang Campaign

- Starting end of May Cl0p ransomware gang, mass-exploited a zero-day vulnerability in the MOVEit Transfer product, tracked as CVE-2023-34362, to steal data from large organizations worldwide.
- In total, 3 additional vulnerabilities reported – patches available
- Hundreds of victims including federal government, state government, and healthcare covered entities and business associates

### **Clearwater**



Data and graphic from KonBriefing Research as of July 10, 2023. https://konbriefing.com/en-topics/cyber-attacks-moveit-victim-list.html

## **Recent Notable Advisories**



#### Link to Advisory

#### **Clearwater**

- June 14
- Details observed activity in LockBit ransomware incidents
- Advisory provides recommendations for identifying and stopping Lockbit

An official website of the United States government H	rre's how you know ~	_
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY		Menu
AMERICA'S CYB	ER DEFENSE AGENCY	
Home / News & Events / Cybersecurity Advis	ories / Cybersecurity Advisory SHARE: 🚱	O in (
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#StopRansomware: CL0F CVE-2023-34362 MOVEi	P Ransomware Gang Ex t Vulnerability	ploits
Release Date: June 07, 2023	Alert Code: AA23-158A	
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Link to Advisory

- June7
- Recommended actions and mitigations to protect against CLOP exploiting MOVEit
- Disseminates known CL0P ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations

### Notable Advisories (cont).

A Chinese hacking group (Storm-0558) has breached Microsoft email accounts of more than two dozen organizations worldwide, including U.S. and Western European government agencies, according to Microsoft.

Link to Advisory

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#### Enhanced Monitoring to Detect APT Activity Targeting Outlook Online

#### SUMMARY

In June 2023, a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency identified suspicious activity in their Microsoft 385 (M385) cloud environment. The agency reported the activity to Microsoft and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Microsoft determined that advanced persistent Threat (APT) actors accessed and exititrated unclassified Exchange Online Outlook data.

CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide guidance to critical infrastructure organizations on enhancing monitoring of Microsoft Exchange Childe environments: Organizations can enhance their cybe produce and position themselves to detect similar mailcoux activity by implementing logging recommendations in this advisory. Organizations that identify suspicious, anomalous activity should contact Microsoft for proceeding with mitigation actions due to the cloud-based infrastructure affected, as well as report to CISA and the FBI.

#### TECHNICAL DETAILS

In Mid-June 2023, an FCEB agency observed MailItematiccessed events with an unexpected Clientoppil and Jappil in M365 Audit Logs. The MailItematiccessed event is generated when licensed users access items in Exchange Online mailoous using any connectivity protocol from any client. The FCEB agency deemed this activity suspicious because the observed Jappil did not normally access mailbox items in their environment. The agency reported the activity to Microsoft and CISA.

Microsoft determined that APT actors accessed and exfittrated undessified Exchange Online Outlook data from a small number of accounts. The APT actors used a Microsoft account (MSA) consume key to forge tokens to impersonate consumer and enterprise users. Microsoft metadated the issue by first blocking tokens issued with the acquired key and then replacing the key to prevent continued misue [1].

The affected FCEB agency identified suspicious activity by leveraging enhanced logging—specifically of MailTeesAccessed events—and an established baseline of normal Outlook activity (e.g., expected AppID). The MailTeesAccessed event enables detection of otherwise difficult to detect adversarial activity.

#### July 12

- Guidance to critical infrastructure organizations on enhancing monitoring of Microsoft Exchange Online environments (logging)
- Provides additional cloud mitigation recommendations

## OCR Enforcement Since Last Cyber Briefing

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 28, 2023 Contact: HHS Press Office 202-690-6343 <u>media@hhs.gov</u>

HHS Office for Civil Rights Settles HIPAA Investigation with iHealth Solutions Regarding Disclosure of Protected Health Information on an Unsecured Server for \$75,000

iHealth Solutions is a Business Associate and settled a data breach affecting 267 individuals

"OCR's investigation found evidence of the potential failure by iHealth Solutions to have in place **an analysis to determine risks and vulnerabilities** to electronic protected health information across the organization"

## Additional Recommendations For Mature Organizations to Address Current Threat Environment

- Know where your data is! Ensure Risk Analysis is up to date and has analyzed specific risks and controls at the information systems level
- Respond to high risks through diligent risk treatment and risk management processes
- Conduct on-going vulnerability management not just periodic scans and patch critical or high vulnerabilities
- Monitor and act on-going threat intelligence and alerts from H-ISAC, CISA, and other agencies
- Ensure that the security controls you have in place are working as you expect
- Assess high impact third parties for risk, including asking questions about their vulnerability management programs and risk analysis
- Develop and test incident response plans



## Update to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

- NIST v2.0 in draft and public comment period
- Planned release in early 2024
- Emphasis on Governance & Supply Chain Risk Management
- Notable new categories: Organizational Context, Platform Security, and Technology Infrastructure Resilience

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#### NIST ANTIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOG

NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Concept Paper: Potential Significant Updates to the Cybersecurity Framework January 19, 2023

#### Note to Reviewers

NIST is publishing this concept paper to seek additional input on the structure and direction of the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF or Framework) before crafting a draft of CSF 2.0. This concept paper outlines more significant potential changes that NIST is considering in developing CSF 2.0. These potential changes are informed by the extensive feedback received to date, including in response to the <u>NIST Cybersecurity Request</u> for Information (RFI) and the first workshop on CSF 2.0.

Some of the proposed changes outlined here are larger structural changes that may impact compatibility with CSF 1.1, thus warranting additional attention and discussion. This paper also outlines potential major changes to CSF resources, including the CSF website, Profiles, mappings, and guidance.

This paper *does not cover all* potential changes that may be made to the Framework structure, format, and content, especially specific changes to Categories and Subcategories of the CSF Core. NIST continues to welcome input on specific changes, including redlines, to the CSF narrative and Core, as well as to related CSF resources. NIST seeks feedback on this paper to inform further development of CSF 2.0, including, for each numbered section (e.g., Section 1.1. 'Change the CSF's title..'):

- Do the proposed changes reflect the current cybersecurity landscape (standards, risks, and technologies)?
- 2. Are the proposed changes sufficient and appropriate? Are there other elements that should be considered under each area?
- 3. Do the proposed changes support different use cases in various sectors, types, and sizes of organizations (and with varied capabilities, resources, and technologies)?
- Are there additional changes not covered here that should be considered?
- For those using CSF 1.1, would the proposed changes affect continued adoption of the Framework, and how so?
- For those not using the Framework, would the proposed changes affect the potential use of the Framework?

Feedback and comments should be directed to <u>cyberframework@nist.gov</u> by March 3, 2023. All relevant comments, including attachments and other supporting material, will be made publicly available on the <u>NIST</u> <u>CSF 2.0 website</u>. Personal, sensitive, or confidential business information should not be included. Comments with inappropriate language will not be considered. The changes proposed in this paper will also be discussed at the upcoming <u>second CSF 2.0 virtual workshop</u> on February 15, 2023, and during <u>CSF 2.0 in-person working</u> <u>sessions</u> on February 22-23, 2023. Contact <u>cyberframework@nist.gov</u> if you would like NIST to consider participating at a conference, webinar, or informal roundtable to discuss the CSF update and this paper.

After reviewing feedback on this concept paper and considering insights gained through the workshops, NIST intends to publish the draft Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 in the coming months for a 90-day public review.

## Time to Act

**Planning**: Understand the changes and enhancements with NIST CSF 2.0

Preparation: Update your security strategy to achieve a new target profile

**Assumption**: New evaluation criteria is required to determine the performance of your security program

## Insights

 We must continue to advance information security to achieve and maintain resilience



Know your Adversary Assess the Security Program Determine your Risk



# Framework Overview

NIST CSF 2.0

## Today: NIST Cybersecurity Framework v1.1

Function	Description	Category
Identify (ID)	Develop an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities.	<ul> <li>Asset Management ID.AM</li> <li>Business Environment ID.BE</li> <li>Governance ID.GV</li> <li>Risk Assessment ID.RA</li> <li>Risk Management ID.RM</li> <li>Supply Chain Risk ID.SC</li> </ul>
Protect (PR)	Develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services	<ul> <li>Identify Management, Authentication, and Access Control PR.AC</li> <li>Awareness &amp; Training PR.AT</li> <li>Data Security PR.DS</li> <li>Information Protection Processes and Procedures PR.IP</li> <li>Maintenance PR.MA</li> <li>Protective Technology PR.PT</li> </ul>
Detect (DE)	Develop and implement appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event.	<ul> <li>Anomalies and Events DE.AE</li> <li>Security Continuous Monitoring DE.CM</li> <li>Detection Processes and Procedures DE.DP</li> </ul>
Respond (RS)	Develop and implement appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity incident.	<ul> <li>Response Planning RS.RP</li> <li>Communications RS.CO</li> <li>Analysis RS.AN</li> <li>Mitigation RS.MI</li> <li>Improvements RA.IM</li> </ul>
Recover (RC)	Develop and implement appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity incident.	<ul> <li>Recovery Planning RC.RP</li> <li>Improvements RC.IM</li> <li>Communications RC.CO</li> </ul>

## Tomorrow: NIST Cybersecurity Framework v2.0

Function	Description	Category
Govern (GV)	Establish and monitor organization risk management strategy, expectations, and policy.	<ul> <li>Organizational Context GV.OC</li> <li>Risk Management Strategy (GV.RM)</li> <li>Roles and Responsibilities (GV.RR)</li> <li>Policies and Procedures (GV.PO)</li> </ul>
Identify (ID)	Determine the current cybersecurity risk to the organization.	<ul> <li>Asset Management ID.AM</li> <li>Risk Assessment (ID.RA)</li> <li>Supply Chain Risk ID.SC</li> <li>Improvements ID.IM</li> </ul>
Protect (PR)	Use safeguards to sufficiently mitigate and reduce cybersecurity risk.	<ul> <li>Identify Management, Authentication, and Access Control PR.AA</li> <li>Awareness &amp; Training PR.AT</li> <li>Data Security PR.DS</li> <li>Protective Technology PR.PT</li> <li>Platform Security (PR.PS)</li> <li>Technology Infrastructure Resilience (PR.IR)</li> </ul>
Detect (DE)	Find and analyze possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises.	<ul><li>Adverse Event Analysis (DE.AE)</li><li>Continuous Monitoring DE.CM</li></ul>
Respond (RS)	Take action regarding a detected cybersecurity incident.	<ul> <li>Incident Management (RS.MA)</li> <li>Incident Analysis (RS.AN)</li> <li>Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO)</li> <li>Incident Mitigation (RS.MI)</li> </ul>
Recover (RC)	Restore assets and operations that were impacted by a cybersecurity incident.	<ul> <li>Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)</li> <li>Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO)</li> </ul>

## Overlay

Function	V1.1 Category	V2.0 Category
Govern (GV)		<ul> <li>Organizational Context GV.OC</li> <li>Risk Management Strategy (GV.RM)</li> <li>Roles and Responsibilities (GV.RR)</li> <li>Policies and Procedures (GV.PO)</li> </ul>
Identify (ID)	<ul> <li>Asset Management ID.AM</li> <li>Business Environment ID.BE</li> <li>Governance ID.GV</li> <li>Risk Assessment ID.RA</li> <li>Risk Management ID.RM</li> <li>Supply Chain Risk ID.SC</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Asset Management ID.AM</li> <li>Risk Assessment (ID.RA)</li> <li>Supply Chain Risk ID.SC</li> <li>Improvements ID.IM</li> </ul>
Protect (PR)	<ul> <li>Identify Management, Authentication, and Access Control PR.AC</li> <li>Awareness &amp; Training PR.AT</li> <li>Data Security PR.DS</li> <li>Information Protection Processes and Procedures PR.IP</li> <li>Maintenance PR.MA</li> <li>Protective Technology PR.PT</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Identify Management, Authentication, and Access Control PR.AA</li> <li>Awareness &amp; Training PR.AT</li> <li>Data Security PR.DS</li> <li>Protective Technology PR.PT</li> <li>Platform Security (PR.PS)</li> <li>Technology Infrastructure Resilience (PR.IR)</li> </ul>
Detect (DE)	<ul> <li>Anomalies and Events DE.AE</li> <li>Security Continuous Monitoring DE.CM</li> <li>Detection Processes and Procedures DE.DP</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Adverse Event Analysis (DE.AE)</li> <li>Continuous Monitoring DE.CM</li> </ul>
Respond (RS)	<ul> <li>Response Planning RS.RP</li> <li>Communications RS.CO</li> <li>Analysis RS.AN</li> <li>Mitigation RS.MI</li> <li>Improvements RA.IM</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Incident Management (RS.MA)</li> <li>Incident Analysis (RS.AN)</li> <li>Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO)</li> <li>Incident Mitigation (RS.MI)</li> </ul>
Recover (RC)	<ul> <li>Recovery Planning RC.RP</li> <li>Improvements RC.IM</li> <li>Communications RC.CO</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)</li> <li>Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO)</li> </ul>

## 

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
The		GV.0C-01	Organizational mission is understood in order to prioritize cybersecurity risk management
	The organization's risk context,	GV.0C-02	Internal and external stakeholders, and their expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management, are determined
Context (GV.OC)	priorities, stakeholders, objectives, and direction, is understood	GV.OC-03	Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil liberties obligations, are understood and managed
		GV.0C-04	Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that stakeholders expect are determined and communicated
		GV.RM-01	Cybersecurity risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
		GV.RM-02 Cybersecurity supply chain risk management strong organizational stakeholders, and managed	Cybersecurity supply chain risk management strategy is established, agreed to by organizational stakeholders, and managed
Risk Management	constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and	GV.RM-03	Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are determined and communicated based on the organization's business environment
Strategy (GV.RM)	assumptions are established and	GV.RM-04	Cybersecurity risk management is considered part of enterprise risk management
	decisions	GV.RM-05	Strategic direction describing appropriate risk response options, including cybersecurity risk transfer mechanisms (e.g., insurance, outsourcing), investment in mitigations, and risk acceptance is established and communicated
		GV.RM-06	Responsibility and accountability are determined and communicated for ensuring that the risk management strategy and program are resourced, implemented, assessed, and maintained

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
		GV.RR-01	Organizational leadership takes responsibility for decisions associated with cybersecurity risks and establishes a culture that is risk-aware, behaves in an ethical manner, and promotes continuous improvement
	Cybersecurity roles and	GV.RR-02	Roles and responsibilities related to cybersecurity risk management are established and communicated
Roles and	responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with all internal and external	GV.RR-03	Roles and responsibilities for customers, partners, and other third-party stakeholders are established and communicated
Responsibilities (GV.RR)	stakeholders to enable accountability, performance	GV.RR-04	Roles and responsibilities for suppliers are established, documented in contractual language, and communicated
	improvement	GV.RR-05	Lines of communication across the organization are established for cybersecurity risks, including supply chain risks
		GV.RR-06	Resourcing and authorities for cybersecurity are decided commensurate with risk strategy, roles, and policies
		GV.RR-07	Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices
	Organizational cybersocurity	GV.PO-01	Policies, processes, and procedures for managing cybersecurity risks are established based on organizational context, risk management strategy, and priorities and are communicated
Policies and Procedures (GV.PO)	<b>W.PO</b> ) organizational cyber security policies, processes, and procedures are established and communicated	GV.PO-02	The same policies used internally are applied to suppliers
		GV.PO-03	Policies and procedures are reviewed, updated, and communicated to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology, and organizational mission

# Govern(GV) Establish and monitor organization risk management strategy, expectations, and policy.

## Identify (ID)

Determine the current cybersecurity risk to the organization.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
		ID.AM-01	Inventories of physical devices managed by the organization are maintained
	Assets (e.g. data devices	ID.AM-02	Inventories of software and services managed by the organization are maintained
	software, systems, facilities, people) that enable the organization	ID.AM-03	Representations of the organization's authorized network communication and network data flows are maintained
Asset Management ID.AM	to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent	ID.AM-04	Inventories of external assets and suppliers are maintained
	with their relative importance to	ID.AM-05	Assets are prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and organizational value
	organization's risk strategy	ID.AM-06	Sensitive data and corresponding metadata are inventoried and tracked
		ID.AM-07	Systems, devices, and software are managed throughout their life cycle, including pre- deployment checks, preventive maintenance, transfers, end-of- life, and disposition
		ID.RM-01	Cybersecurity risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
	The summary in all such as the state of	ID.RM-02	Cybersecurity supply chain risk management strategy is established, agreed to by organizational stakeholders, and managed
Risk Assessment	constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and	ID.RM-03	Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are determined and communicated based on the organization's business environment
(ID.RA)	assumptions are established and	ID.RM-04	Cybersecurity risk management is considered part of enterprise risk management
	decisions	ID.RM-05	Strategic direction describing appropriate risk response options, including cybersecurity risk transfer mechanisms (e.g., insurance, outsourcing), investment in mitigations, and risk acceptance is established and communicated
		ID.RM-06	Responsibility and accountability are determined and communicated for ensuring that the risk management strategy and program are resourced, implemented, assessed, and maintained

## Identify (ID) Determine the current cybersecurity risk to the organization.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
Supply Chain Dick	The organization's supply chain risks are identified, assessed, and	ID.SC-01	Cybersecurity requirements are integrated into contracts with suppliers and third-party partners
Management (ID.SC)	managed consistent with the organization's priorities, constraints risk tolerances and	ID.SC-02	Suppliers and third-party partners are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm they are meeting their contractual obligations
assumptions	assumptions	ID.SC-03	Supplier termination and transition processes include security considerations
Improvement (ID.IM)	Improvements to organizational	ID.RM-01	Continuous evaluation, including through reviews, audits, and assessments (including self- assessments), is applied to identify opportunities for improvement across all Framework Functions
	cybersecurity risk management processes and activities are identified	ID.RM-02	Security tests and exercises, including in coordination with suppliers and third-party providers, are carried out to identify improvements
		ID.RM-03	Improvements for processes and activities across all Framework Functions are identified based on lessons learned

## Protect(PR) Use safeguards to sufficiently mitigate and reduce cybersecurity risk.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
		PR.AA-01	Identities and credentials for authorized users, processes, and devices are managed by the organization
		PR.AA-02	Identities are proofed and bound to credentials based on the context of interactions
Identity	Access to physical and logical assets is limited to authorized	PR.AA-03	Users, processes, and devices are authenticated
Management, Authentication, and	users, processes, and devices, and	PR.AA-04	Federated assertions are generated, protected, conveyed, and verified
Access Control (PR.AA)	assessed risk of unauthorized access	PR.AA-05	Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are managed and enforced, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties
		PR.AA-06	Account activities and access events are audited and monitored to enforce authorized access
		PR.AA-07	Physical access to assets is managed, monitored, and enforced
	The evention's personnal and	PR.AT-01	Awareness and training are provided for users so they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks
Awaranasa and	third-parties are provided cybersecurity awareness and	PR.AT-02	Awareness and training are provided for users with elevated privileges so they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks
Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	training to perform their cybersecurity-related tasks consistent with related policies,	PR.AT-03	Awareness and training are provided for third parties with cybersecurity responsibilities (e.g., suppliers, partners, customers) so they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks
	procedures, and agreements	PR.AT-04	Awareness and training are provided to senior leaders so they possess the knowledge and skills to govern and lead a cybersecurity risk-aware culture

## Protect(PR) Use safeguards to sufficiently mitigate and reduce cybersecurity risk.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
		PR.DS-01	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest is protected
	Information and records (data) are	PR.DS-02	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit is protected
(PR.DS)	organization's risk strategy to	PR.DS-03	Data is managed throughout its life cycle, including discovery, maintenance, and destruction
	and availability of information	PR.DS-04	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use is protected
		PR.DS-05	Backups of data are conducted, protected, maintained, and tested
		PR.PS-01	Configuration management practices are applied (e.g., least functionality, least privilege)
		PR.PS-02	Software is patched, updated, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk
		PR.PS-03	Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk
	I he hardware and software (e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications) of physical and virtual	PR.PS-04	Log records are generated for cybersecurity events and made available for continuous monitoring
(PR.PS)	platforms are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy	PR.PS-05	Protective technologies are executed on or within platforms to stop unauthorized software execution
	integrity, and availability	PR.PS-06	Backups of platform software are conducted, protected, maintained, and tested
		PR.PS-07	Secure software development practices are integrated and their performance is monitored throughout the software development life cycle
		PR.PS-08	Supply chain security practices are integrated and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle

## Protect (PR) Use safeguards to sufficiently mitigate and reduce cybersecurity risk.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
	PR.IR-01	Response and recovery plans (e.g., incident response plan, business continuity plan, disaster recovery plan, contingency plan) are communicated and maintained	
Technology	Security architectures are managed	PR.IR-02	The organization's networks and environments are protected from unauthorized logical access and usage
Infrastructure	to protect asset confidentiality,	PR.IR-03	The organization's computing assets are protected from environmental threats
Resilience (PR.IR)	integrity, and availability, and organization resilience	PR.IR-04	Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations
	PR.IR-05	Adequate resource capacity (e.g., storage, power, network bandwidth, computing) to ensure availability is maintained	

## Detect(DE) Find and analyze possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
		DE.AE-01	Adverse events are analyzed to find possible attacks and compromises
		DE.AE-02	Information on adverse events is correlated from multiple sources
	Adverse cybersecurity events are analyzed to find and characterize	DE.AE-03	The estimated impact and scope of adverse events is determined
Adverse Event	possible attacks and compromises, unauthorized and inappropriate	DE.AE-04	Incident alert thresholds are established
Analysis (DE.AE)	activities, protection deficiencies, and other activity with a potentially	DE.AE-05	Information on adverse events is provided to cybersecurity and incident response tools and staff
	negative impact on cybersecurity	DE.AE-06	Contextual information (e.g., cyber threat intelligence, inventories, security advisories) is integrated into the adverse event analysis
		DE.AE-07	Adverse cybersecurity events are categorized and potential incidents are escalated for triage
	Assets are monitored to find	DE.CM-01	Networks and network services are monitored to find adverse cybersecurity events
	potential adverse cybersecurity events, including indicators of	DE.CM-02	The physical environment is monitored to find adverse cybersecurity events
Continuous Monitoring	attacks and compromise,	DE.CM-03	Personnel activity and technology usage are monitored to find adverse cybersecurity events
(DE.CM) activity, protection deficiencies failures and other activity with a potentially negative impact on cybersecurity	activity, protection deficiencies and failures and other activity with a	DE.CM-04	External service providers and the services they provide are monitored to find adverse cybersecurity events
	potentially negative impact on cybersecurity	DE.CM-05	Computing hardware and software and their data are monitored to find adverse cybersecurity events

## Respond (RS) Take action regarding a detected cybersecurity incident.

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
Response Planning (RS.RP)	Responses to detected cybersecurity incidents are managed	RS.MA-01	The incident response plan is executed
		RS.MA-02	Incident reports are triaged and validated
		RS.MA-03	Incidents are categorized and prioritized
		RS.MA-04	Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed
		RS.MA-05	Criteria for initiating incident recovery defined and applied
Incident Analysis (RS.AN)	Investigation is conducted to ensure effective response and support recovery activities	RS.AN-01	Analysis is performed to determine what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident
		RS.AN-02	Actions performed during an investigation are recorded and the record's integrity and provenance are preserved
		RS.AN-03	Incident data and metadata are collected and their integrity and provenance are preserved
		RS.AN-04	Incident magnitude is estimated and validated
		RS.AN-05	Incident status is tracked and validated

## Recover(RC) Restore assets and operations that were impacted by a cybersecurity incident

Category	Description	Sub-Cat	Description
Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)	Restoration activities are planned and performed to ensure full operational availability of systems and services affected by cybersecurity incidents	RC.RP-01	The incident recovery plan is executed
		RC.RP-02	Recovery actions are determined, scoped, prioritized, and performed
		RC.RP-03	The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration
		RC.RP-04	Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms
		RC.RP-05	The integrity of restored assets is verified, systems and services are restored, and normal operating status is confirmed
		RC.RP-06	Criteria for determining the end of incident recovery are defined and applied, and incident- related documentation is completed
Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO)	Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties (e.g., coordinating centers, Internet Service Providers, owners of attacking systems, victims, other computer security incident response teams, and vendors)	RC.CO-01	Public relations are managed
		RC.CO-02	Reputation is repaired after an incident
		RC.CO-03	Recovery activities and progress in restoring operational capabilities are communicated to designated internal and external stakeholders

## Next Steps

Plan: Understand the changes and enhancements with NIST CSF 2.0

Prepare: Update your security strategy to achieve a new target profile

**Assume**: New evaluation criteria is required to determine conformance and effectiveness of the categories





We are here to help. Moving healthcare organizations to a more secure, compliant, and resilient state so they can achieve their mission.

## Upcoming Events



HIMSS Healthcare Cybersecurity Forum | September 7 - 8, 2023, Boston, MA

Dykema | July 19-21, 2023

**Dykema** 

August Cyber Briefing | August 3, 2023,12pm – 1pm (CT)



## Contact us

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